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LAW'S RELIGION:
RENDERING CULTURE©
BENJAMIN L. BERGER*
This article argues that constitutional law's
inability to deal with religion in a satisfying way flows,
in part, from its failure to understand religion as, in a
robust sense, culture. Once one begins to understand
the Canadian constitutional rule Of law itself as a
cultural form, it becomes apparent that law renders
religion in a very particular fashion, and that this
rendering is a product of law's symbolic categories and
interpretive horizons. This article draws out the
elements of Canadian constitutionalism's unique
rendering of religion and argues that, although
Canadian constitutionalism claims to understand
religion as a culture, this is true only in the thinnest
of senses. More accurate (and more illuminating) is
the claim that law's view of religion is, itself,
profoundly cultural.
Cet article avance que l'incapacit6 du droit
constitutionnel A composer avec la religion de mani~re
satisfaisante d6coule, en partic, de son insuccs A
comprendre la religion comme une culture-dans un
sens plein. Une fois que Ion commence A comprendre la
primaut6 du droit constitutionnel canadien elle-m~me
comme une forme culturelle, il devient 6vident que le
droit interpr~te la religion d'une faqon tres particuli~re,
et que cette interpr6tation est un produit des cat6gories
symboliques et des horizons interpr6tatifs du droit. Cet
article extrait du constitutionnalisme canadien les 616ments
de l'interpr6tation unique de la religion, et affirme que
m~me si le constitutionnalisme canadien pr6tend
comprendre la religion comme une culture, ceci nest
vrai que dans le sens le plus restreint. Plus exacte (et plus
6difiante) est la pr6tention que la fagon dont le droit voit
la religion, est, elle-m~me, profond6ment culturelle.
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. Since the introduction of the Charter in 1982, a tradition of
critical legal scholarship has attempted to understand the various
ideological and political commitments that inform and, indeed, often
determine the shape of constitutional adjudication. This tradition can be
traced to early critics who argued that the Charter's roots in liberal
ideological commitments would prevent the progressive hopes
surrounding it to be ultimately-or perhaps even passingly-realized in
the realms of political, social, and economic injustice.2 Others have
extended this form of critical analysis to draw out the structural and
ideological limitations of Charter adjudication of particular rights. Joel
Bakan, for example, exposes the embedded assumptions within areas
such as expressive and associational rights.3 Addressing freedom of
expression, Bakan argues that "the liberal conception of freedom of
expression that dominates the Court's jurisprudence on section 2(b) and
popular debate about free. speech cannot accommodate a progressive
politics of communication."4 Others have applied this critical lens to the
development of equality jurisprudence in Canada, and have shown that,
despite a rhetoric of substantive equality, the analytic approach to
section 15 effects a kind of progressively intensive context-stripping that
has left us with a concept of equality that is largely formal.5 The very
"Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
2 See e.g. Allan C. Hutchinson & Andrew Petter, "Private Rights-Public Wrongs: The
Liberal Lie of the Charter' (1988) 38 U.T.L.J. 278; Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the
Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Wall & Thompson, 1989); and H.J. Glasbeek, "A No-
Frills Look at the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or How Politicians and Lawyers Hide Reality"
(1989) 9 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 293. For a recent critique of the capacity of rights
constitutionalism to achieve social democratic ends, see Gavin W. Anderson, "Social Democracy
and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism" (2004) 17 Can. J.L. & Jur. 31.
'Joel Bakan, Just Words. Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1997). In his treatment of freedom of association, Bakan concludes (at 85) that
"[b]ecause of its dyadic, negative, and anti-statist form, freedom of association can contemplate
only restrictions on workers' collective action directly imposed by the state. Though such
restrictions are not insignificant, they are only part of labour's problem. Economic forces are
primarily responsible for eroding labour's power." For another critical piece in this tradition written
from a class-based perspective, see Judy Fudge & Harry Glasbeek, "The Politics of Rights: A
Politics with Little Class" (1992) 1 Soc. & Leg. Stud. 45.
4 Bakan, ibid. at 76.
' Hester Lessard, "Mothers, Fathers, and Naming: Reflections on the Law Equality
Framework and Trociuk v. British Columbia (A.G.]' (2004) 16 C.J.W.L. 165. Lessard demonstrates
at 174 that the "sequential logic driving the organization of the Lawframework too often converges
with the political logic of formal equality, greatly constraining" the capacity of the law to address
[VOL. 45, NO. 2
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analytical structure applied peels away the historical and social
dimensions of inequality, focussing instead on concepts critical to law's
own neo-liberal political assumptions, concepts such as choice and
negative freedom. This tradition of critical analysis of Charter
constitutionalism has also informed the debate surrounding the
legitimacy of judicial review and, most recently, has been one face of the
academic response to the controversial constitutionalization of the
healthcare debate.6
This critical tradition has, however, largely bypassed the analysis
of religious liberties in Canada. At the level of political and legal
rhetoric, the protection of religious liberties symbolizes Canadian
constitutionalism's commitment to multiculturalism and the protection
of plural cultural forms.7 The conventional narrative casts constitutional
law as the mechanism for the recognition and accommodation of diverse
cultures and section 2(a) of the Charter as the specific conduit for
considering and making legal space for religious claims within a polity
devoted to cultural pluralism. In this conventional account, it is assumed
both that law does indeed treat religion as a form of culture and that law
the substantive aspects of unequal treatment. At 183, Lessard argues further that such a context-
stripping methodology, "especially one aimed at the context of social and material
disadvantagement, reinforces rather than destabilizes the distinction that underpins formal
conceptions of equality, between public, legally recognized inequalities and private, social
inequalities." In effect, the structure of equality adjudication has a cascading effect that tends to
collapse substantive equality claims into the neo-liberal logic of formal equality. For an early
analysis of the limits of rights-based equality that focuses on the private-public distinction see Judy
Fudge, "The Private-Public Distinction: The Possibilities of and the Limits to the Use of Charter
Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall L.J. 485.
6 See Chaoulli v. Quebec (A.G.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoull], as well as Andrew Petter,
"Wealthcare: The Politics of the Charter Revisited" in Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne
Sossin, eds., Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Pnivate Health Insurance in
Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 116. See also Benjamin L. Berger, "Using the
Charter to Cure Health Care: Panacea or Placebo?" (2003) 8:1 Review of Constitutional Studies 20
(questioning the possibilities of progressive change to the healthcare system through Charter
adjudication) [Berger, "Panacea or Placebo"].
'On freedom of religion in Canada see generally Richard Moon, "Liberty, Neutrality, and
Inclusion: Religious Freedom Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (2003) 41:3
Brandeis L.J. 562; Benjamin L. Berger, "The Limits of Belief: Freedom of Religion, Secularism,
and the Liberal State" (2002) 17:1 C.J.L.S. 39 [Berger, "Limits of Belief']; and Paul Horwitz, "The
Sources and Limits of Freedom of Religion in a Liberal Democracy: Section 2(a) and Beyond"
(1996) 54 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 1. For an historical exploration of the relationship between religious
communities and the law in Canada, see John McLaren & Harold Coward, Religious Conscience, the
State, and the Law: Histoical Contexts and ContemporaySignificance (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1999).
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itself is separate from and above the cultural fray. This article will
critically examine and challenge this conventional discourse by asking
the question "is law's understanding of religion a 'cultural' one?"
The answer turns out to be interestingly ambivalent, and this
ambivalence turns on an appreciation of the thickly cultural nature of
Canadian constitutionalism. As such, the goal of this article is to
combine the study of religious liberties in Canada with the critical
tradition described above, but to do so in the context of a larger project
aimed at exploring the extent to which the modern interaction of
law and religion is best understood as a meeting of meaning-laden
cultural forms.!
When Canadian constitutional law turns its attention to religion,
religion takes on a very particular shape that emphasizes certain aspects
of religious conscience and practice while obscuring others. Law renders
religion in a unique fashion, which can be exposed by drawing upon the
discourse of the Supreme Court of Canada in its treatment of claims of
religious freedom. This article's guiding question is as follows: if one's
only source of information were the constitutional discourse of the
courts, what would one conclude about the nature of religion?
Otherwise put, what does religion look like when viewed through the
lens of modern Canadian constitutional law? By answering this question
we can both gain insight into the way that religion is conceived of in
modern public debate and identify the ways in which the phenomenon
of religion is tailored to fit within-and be digested by-the legal and
political imagination.
8 The claim that Canadian constitutionalism can be understood as a "culture" obviously
demands careful attention to and precise definition of the concept.of "culture" itself. As I mention
later in this article, I take "culture" to refer to an interpretive horizon, composed of sets of symbols
and categories of thought, out of which meaning can be given to experience. It is a system of
background understandings that inform-and the process by which we generate-our
interpretations of our world. Although a full discussion and careful justification of this definition is
beyond the scope of this piece, in the larger project of which this article is a part, I derive this
conception of "culture" from an analysis of the term's treatment in two academic traditions,
interpretive anthropology and philosophical hermeneutics. For the text of a public address that
gives an account of this larger project, see Benjamin L. Berger, "Understanding Law and Religion
as Culture: Making Room for Meaning in the Public Sphere" (2006) 15 Const. F. 15 [Berger, "Law
and Religion as Culture"].
280 [VOL. 45, NO. 2
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Just as has been the case in the modern theory of religion,9 when
religion is put before the bar of law, law understands and casts its
subject in accordance with its own informing commitments. As the
various features of law's peculiar understanding of religion are
identified and described in this article, it will become clear that modern
Canadian constitutional law casts religion in terms compatible with its
own structural assumptions, as well as symbolic and normative
commitments, which are themselves informed by the contemporary
political culture of liberalism. Although this imagining of religion has a
potentially reductionist and context-stripping effect, it is not simply a
defect that calls for remedy; rather, the law has no choice but to
conceive of religion in terms cognizable within constitutional liberalism.
The result of this selective rendering, however, is to substantially
impoverish the assertion that religion is a culture.
Before turning to the jurisprudence as a resource from which to
draw out Canadian constitutional law's particular understanding of
religion, it is worth pausing to acknowledge that by focussing attention
upon the constitutional discourse of the courts I am narrowing the
inquiry to one particular source of information about the state's
treatment of religion. The image of religion generated by debates in
Parliament or speeches made by members of the executive branch may
differ from the image that emerges from the work of the judicial branch.
The goal, however, is to deepen our sense of the way in which law
understands religion and the respects in which this image diverges from
a robust conception of religion as culture. With this appreciation in
hand, we are equipped to better understand the nature and challenges
of the relationship between religion and the Canadian constitutional
rule of law. The courts hold a privileged position in managing this
9 See e.g. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. by Karen E.
Fields (New York: The Free Press, 1995) [originally published 1912], in which Durkheim offers his
theory that religion is a symbolic means of binding the individual to the group and committing this
individual to the group's welfare; Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo: Some Points of Agreement
between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics" in Albert Dickson, ed., The Origins of
Religion, vol. 13 (London & New York: Penguin Books, 1990) 43 [originally published in 1913]; and
Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion" in Albert Dickson, ed., Civilization, Society and
Religion, vol. 12 (London & New York: Penguin Books, 1991) 179 [originally published in 1927], in
which Freud explains religion as affording a set of beliefs and practices that give us comfort in the
face of our own mortality and help to justify the repression of our urges in the name of social and
moral constraint.
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interaction, and it is for this reason that it is to the discourse of the
Supreme Court of Canada that I now turn.
I. LAW'S THEORY OF RELIGION
Canadian constitutional law has a distinct theory of religion
°
and, influenced by this theory, it shapes religion in its own ideological
image and likeness while notionally confining religion to discrete
dimensions of human life. In this respect, constitutional analysis
engages in a kind of context-stripping whereby the religious is made to
fit the range of symbolic and normative commitments essential to
Canadian constitutional culture. In this article I analyze claims to
religious liberties under the Charter as means of exposing this legal
rendering of religion.
This descriptive endeavour is greatly aided by the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem," in
which the Court discussed the legal approach to freedom of religion and
offered the following definition of religion:
Defined broadly, religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive system of
faith and worship. Religion also tends to involve the belief in a divine, superhuman or
controlling power. In essence, religion is about freely and deeply held personal
convictions or beliefs connected to an individual's spiritual faith and integrally linked to
one's self-definition and spiritual fulfilment, the practices of which allow individuals to
foster a connection with the divine or with the subject or object of that spiritual faith. 12
Since it offers a relatively clear window into Canadian
constitutionalism's particular understanding of religion, the decision in
Amselem will serve as a principal means of exploring and defending this
claim. As is always the case, however, the Court's reasoning in Amselem
is shaped by the specific context in which the issues arose. In particular,
Amselem is a case about the interaction between public norms and the
contractual rights of individuals, and there can be little doubt that this
factual matrix colours the judges' reasons. However, in the context of
" Though distinct, this theory may well not be unique. To the extent that other
constitutional orders share the cultural commitments that I describe below-cultural commitments
that I expect would be found in most modern liberal constitutional democracies-I strongly suspect
that a similar rendering of religion takes place. Culturally specific analysis would be needed to
support this larger claim, however.
n1 SyndicatNorthcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 [Amselem].
'
2 Ibid. at para. 39.
[VOL. 45, NO. 2
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the Supreme Court's Charter jurisprudence on the constitutional status
of religion, Amselem points to the elements of Canadian
constitutionalism's theory of religion. As I unpack Amselem, and add
other strands of jurisprudence to enrich the picture, it becomes manifest
that law's sense of religion, though complex, can only be considered a
"cultural" conception of religion in the thinnest of senses. "
The argument that will emerge is that Canadian constitutional
law's image of religion is best understood as comprising three elements,
each of which lead into and mutually support the others. The result is a
cohesive and particular theory of religion. The elements of this
conception are: (a) religion as essentially individual, (b) religion as
centrally addressed to autonomy and choice, and (c) religion as private.
Though each will be considered separately, this separation is somewhat
artificial given that the three elements are mutually informing. As a result,
certain observations could be made in the context of a discussion of more
than one of the elements. In the end, the point is that the three elements
tie together into Canadian constitutionalism's single, integrated rendering
of religion, whose informing source-the origin from which these
elements are reflected-is the political culture of liberalism. 4
II. LAW'S RELIGION AS ESSENTIALLY INDIVIDUAL
Religion cuts its primary constitutional figure in the protection
of religious freedoms. Once religion is embedded within a rights-
protecting instrument, as it is.in the Charter, law's conception of religion
'3 I use the term "thin" here to echo contrastively with Clifford Geertz's conception (itself
borrowed from Gilbert Ryle) of "thick description," which is an account that not only describes
behaviour, but attends to the "meaningful structures" in which a given cultural practice is "produced,
perceived, and interpreted"; in -short, an account that attends to the meaning of the object of
description. Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) at 7. In
stating that law's sense of religion is only cultural in a "thin" sense, I do not mean to suggest that
Canadian constitutional law's sense of religion is entirely without a cultural dimension. As Richard
Moon explains, the priority thus far given by the courts to religious claims in its section 2(a)
jurisprudence (rather than other conscientiously based claims) arguably marks a somewhat cultural or
identity-based aspect to law's understanding of religion. Richard Moon, "Religious Commitment and
Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselen" (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 201. See especially 213-19.
My claim, which I will explore further below, is that from this analytic point on, however, the cultural
component of Canadian constitutional law's religion is deeply attenuated and largely inattentive to the
meaning and significance of the beliefs and practices that comprise this "culture."
See Paul W. Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2005) at 29 (distinguishing liberalism as (a) "a family of political theories"; (b) "a partisan political
practice"; and (c) "a political culture").
2007]
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quite naturally assumes certain characteristics of the philosophical idiom
in which it is placed. The modern drive to universal human rights has
been dominated by a focus on the rights of the individual. This is
eminently true of the Charter, which, with the exception of Aboriginal
and language rights, attaches its protections to the individual. From the
fundamental freedoms found in section 2 to the legal rights of sections 7
to 14 and the equality guarantee in section 15, the Charter conceives of
legally cognizable interests and redressable harms as being enjoyed by
the individual. Even freedom of association essentially redounds to the
benefit of the person, not to that of the group. This pixilation of human
experience has been the subject of academic critique, 5 but is
characteristic of the structure of rights protection and constitutional
adjudication.
The conceptual individualization of religious experience
prepares it for its life in the context of constitutional atomism. The
individual is the dominant unit of constitutional rights analysis. It is
natural, then, for law to conceive of religion, the protection of which is
"one of the hallmarks of enlightened democracy,"16 in a way that can be
assimilated into the analytic structure of constitutionalism. In R. v. Big
M Drug Mart Ltd.,7 the first significant Charter case on freedom of
religion, Justice Dickson (as he then was) suggested exactly this impact
of the Charteron legal thinking about religion: "With the Charter, it has
become the right of every Canadian to work out for himself or herself
what his or her religious obligations, if any, should be."'" But the
structure of Canadian constitutionalism is really only the vehicle for the
transmission of-or perhaps a symptom of-the more foundationally
informing political culture of liberalism, which is itself deeply committed
to the primacy of the individual. Liberalism understands the individual
to be "the elementary unit of explanation"'9 and therefore has difficulty
assimilating the religious other than in its individual dimensions.'z It
'See Bakan, supra note 3.
6 Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 1.
17[1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big Al.
'Ibid. at para. 135.
"'Kahn, supra note 14 at 218.
20 Charles Taylor identifies this liberal individualism as a key feature of modernity leading
to, what he calls, the ideal or ethic of "authenticity" that is peculiar to modem culture. Charles
Taylor, The Malaise of Modernity (Concord: House of Anansi Press, 1991) at 2ff [Taylor, Malaise
[VOL. 45, NO. 2
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ought to come as no surprise, then, that the dominant thread in the
Court's definition and discussion of religion is its focus on religion as a
fundamentally individual phenomenon.
Before drawing out this element of law's religion, it is
worthwhile to pause to consider two objections to my argument. First, to
be sure, since Big M, religious liberties in Canada have been spoken
about in a language thick with conceptions of equality. To some, given
the abstract connection between conceptions of equality and group
belonging, the equality language that runs through the section 2(a)
jurisprudence suggests a more robust role for the group in law's
understanding of religion than I assert. Yet, as others have shown, this
prima facie association between equality and the group has been deeply
attenuated in Canadian equality law, as have been the points in the
equality analysis that hold out the promise of some textured assessment
of social context and the dynamics of group identity. 21 In the end, even
equality claims are atomized in the adjudicative realities of Canadian
constitutional culture, always returning to a commitment to the primacy
of the individual.22 The presence of concepts of equality in discussions
of religious liberty thus offers no rescue from the individualistic
orientation of the section 2(a) jurisprudence.
It is also certainly true that there are aspects of Canadian
constitutionalism that offer protections to religious groups, and that
notes of regard for the collective dimensions of religious experience
sound in the jurisprudence. Most prominent are the rights and liberties
afforded to the Roman Catholic Church in Canada's early constitutional
documents 23 and, more recently, the as-yet-unfulfilled promise of group-
of Modernity. Although he addresses a number of ways in which the ideal of individual
authenticity can lead to richer modes of existence, Taylor's concern is that, taken to its full extent,
this atomism can lead to the abolition of "all horizons of significance," which "threatens us with a
loss of meaning and hence a trivialization of our predicament." Taylor, Malaise of Modernity at 68.
21 See notes 76 to 79, below, and accompanying text.
22This is particularly apparent in the Court's focus on subjective/objective analysis of harm
to dignity that has been installed at the core of the section 15(1) analysis. As I will show in the next
part, there is a similar return to the centrality of autonomy and choice, rather than identity, despite
the formal and rhetorical presence of this dimension of equality in religious freedom.
I See e.g. Treaty of Paris (1763), Britain, Spain and Portugal, 10 February 1763,
reproduced in W.P.M. Kennedy, ed., Statutes, Treaties and Documents of the Canadian
Constitution, 1713-1929, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1930) 31, online: Early
Canadiana Online <http://www.canadiana.org>; Quebec Act (1774), 14 George III, c. 83 (U.K.);
20071
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based protections for Aboriginal spiritual traditions and practices.2 4 But
the purpose of what follows is not to argue that Canadian constitutional
law has no regard whatsoever for the collective dimensions of religious
experience. Instead, the claim is that, at base, law's understanding of
religion is powerfully individualistic and that, wherever else its eyes might
wander, in the contemporary treatment of religious liberties, Canadian
constitutional law invariably returns to a sharp focus on the individual.
Nowhere is this clearer than in the Court's attempt to define the
very subject matter of section 2(a). "In essence," said the majority in
Amselem, "religion is about freely and deeply held personal convictions
or beliefs."'25 The majority makes clear that these personal convictions
are religious to the extent that they connect with "an individual's
spiritual faith., 26 Religion is a personal, not a social, phenomenon and is
located in the individual, not group-based. The end of religion is also
conceived of as individual or personal rather than as some good that
redounds to a traditional or historical community; religion is about "an
individual's self-definition and fulfillment. 27
In Amselem, this focus on the individual finds expression in the
Court's treatment of the doctrinal dispute, internal to Judaism, of
whether a personal succah is required or whether a communal one will
suffice.' The telling point is not the majority's conclusion that the
personal succah is to be permitted, although this conclusion supports my
argument. Rather, the treatment of this dispute is telling because the
Court rejects the notion that, for the purposes of the law, religious
freedom depends in any way on collective conceptions of religious
precept.29 There is a tone of discomfort with the collective or the
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 93, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5;
and Reference Re Bill 30, an Act to amend the Education Act (Ontario), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.
2 Constitution AcA 198, s. 35, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982(U.K.), 1982, c, 11.
2' Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 39 [emphasis added]. For an account of Amselem
that explores the tensions produced by this individualist casting of religious liberty, see Moon,
supra note 13.
26Amselem, ibid. [emphasis added].
27 Ibid. at para. 42.
2 The succah is a temporary shelter that is erected outdoors for the duration of the Jewish
festival of Succot.
29 As I will discuss below, this rejection of doctrinal or community views as determinative of
the issue of religious practice as raised in Amselem also evinces the third element of Canadian
constitutional law's theory of religion: religion as private. See text accompanying notes 113 and 114.
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institutional in the majority's holding that religious practices are
protected irrespective of whether they are "required by official religious
dogma" or are "in conformity with the position of religious officials."3
In this respect, the position articulated in Amselem is consistent
with the much earlier decision in Ross v. New Brunswick School
District No. 15, 31 in which the Court accepted that Ross's anti-Semitic
communications were "of a religious nature"32 and, thus, protected by
section 2(a). Justice La Forest, for a unanimous court, held that it "is
not the role of [the] Court to decide what any particular religion
believes."33 This reticence to pronounce on the content of a particular
religion's beliefs is understandable and, indeed, the Court reaffirmed
this point in Amselem. But if this is the case, how then does the Court
know which communications are of a religious nature and which are
not? In Ross, and again presaging Amselem, the Court's exclusive
referent is the individual. That Ross might have been reflecting an
entirely idiosyncratic view was of no consequence for the Court; the
fact that it was his conscientiously held view made it religious.
Because "freedom of religion ensures that every individual must be
free to hold and to manifest without State interference those beliefs
and opinions dictated by one's conscience,' 4 a Human Rights
Commission's order restricting Ross's capacity to express these views
offended his religious freedom.
Nevertheless, aspects of this limitation on Ross's religious
freedoms were ultimately justified. In some respects, this justification
under section 1 of the Charter might indicate that Canadian
constitutional law's commitment to the individual dimension of religion
is not as strong as I have suggested, ultimately giving way to group
interests: in this case, the group interests of Jews. To be sure, individual
religious liberties sometimes give way to collective goods under section 1
of the Charter, and this may well be an aspect of what was going on in
It is interesting to note that, although one could readily imagine the Court refusing to resolve this
dispute on the basis of a doctrine of non-justiciability, perhaps informed by concerns about
institutional competence, this is not how the Court explains its approach to this issue.
3 0Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 46.
31 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 [Ross].
3
' Ibid. at para. 67.
-
3 Ibid. at para. 70.
-'Ibid. at para. 72 [emphasis added].
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Ross This is, however, just part of the picture gleaned from a treetops
view. A closer look reveals that, as is so often the case, the justificatory
logic has a decidedly individualistic flavour to it. When Justice La Forest
explains why Ross's religious freedoms can be justifiably limited under
section 1, his reasoning is that the protection of Ross's religious
freedoms is weakened because, in his religious expression, he has
undermined the very purpose of religious freedom:
[A]ny religious belief that denigrates and defames the religious beliefs of others erodes
the very basis of the guarantee in s. 2(a)-a basis that guarantees that every individual is
free to hold and to manifest the beliefs dictated by one's conscience. The respondent's
religious views serve to deny Jews respect for dignity and equality said to be among the
fundamental guiding values of a court undertaking a s. 1 analysis.35
Ross loses the protection of section 2(a) because his religious
views deprive other individuals of their parallel right to believe whatever
their consciences dictate, and to do so equally and with dignity.
Amselem and Ross demonstrate that, for the law, what counts as
religious is that which is meaningful to the individual; institutions and
collective traditions are only of derivative importance to the law.36 Law's
approach to religion is characterized by "the centrality of the rights
associated with freedom of individual conscience."37
This focus on the individual was inscribed into the Charter
protection of religion in Edwards Books,38 in which Chief Justice Dickson
explained that "[t]he purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not
interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of
oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different
order of being."39 The individual's sense of his or her own relationship to
the divine or to the object of faith is what lies at the core of law's
imagining of religion.4" As I have explained, this focus on the individual is
3 5 Ibid at para. 94.
-6 This is even true of Bastarache J.'s judgment in Amselem, despite being the only
judgment to refer to the social dimensions of religion. Although he speaks of the "social
significance" of religion, "social significance" refers to formal religious rules and doctrine. This set
of rules operates only as an objective limit on the assertions of the individual, who remains always
at the centre of his analysis.
3 7 Big M, supra note 17 at para. 122.
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [198612 S.C.R. 713 [Edwards Books].
39 Ibid. at para. 97.
w More than once, the Court invokes the term "faith" as important to religion. It is unclear,
though an interesting question, what the Court understands this term to mean.
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not unique to religious freedoms; rather, it is a product of the structure
and the informing ideology of the Charter. One of the hallmarks of the
Charteis individualism is its difficulty in taking cognizance of rights
claims and social policy measures that seek to empower the groups or
institutional contexts that lead to the full enjoyment of the human goods
that the Constitution purports to protect. Not only does the prevailing
equality analysis tend powerfully to extract the individual from her
meaningful group context, but breaches of section 15 with clear group
dimensions have been justified as reasonable under section 1.41 Likewise,
in Chaoulli v. Quebec (A.G.),42 in order to vindicate a wealthy doctor's
section 7 right to contract privately for the provision of health care, the
Court struck down legislative restrictions on private health insurance that
were designed to protect a public health care. system. The Chaoulli
decision dramatically emphasized the extent to which the dedicated
individualism of Charter rights makes the law insensitive to the collective
dimensions of social policy. This resistance to addressing the group and
institutional contexts in which rights are enjoyed has an economic face
that is tied to the positive/negative rights divide, but it also has a deeper
informing structure that relates to constitutional law's liberal capacity to
see the individual far more clearly than the group.
As with associational and equality rights, law's emphasis on the
individual comes clearly into view when one looks to claims to religious
protection that involve collective religious endeavours or institutions.
We see this in Adler v. Ontario,43 in which a group of parents argued
that the state's failure to fund private non-Catholic religious schools was
contrary to their section 2(a) freedom of religion rights.44 Justice
Sopinka, writing for the judges who, addressed the section 2(a)
argument, rejected the claim on the basis that each individual parent has
the choice to send a child to a funded public school. As such, if they
chose to send their children to a religious school, Justice Sopinka held:
[They] have no claim cognizable in law since the disadvantage they must bear is one
flowing exclusively from their religious tenets.
See Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. Newfoundland and Labrador Assn. of Public and
Private Employees (N.A.PE.), [200413 S.C.R. 381.
42 Chaoui, supra note 6.
43[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609 [Adleu.
4 Section 93 of the Constitution Act, 1867 supra note 23, provides that the state is
required to fund private Roman Catholic schools in the province of Ontario.
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... The fact that no funding is provided for private religious education cannot be
considered to infringe the appellants' freedom to educate their children in accordance
with their religious beliefs."5
This decision emphasizes law's focus on religion as choice, which
I will discuss more fully in Part III, below, but also manifests law's
deafness to the centrality of community in the exercise of rights. At one
level, the reasoning in this case might simply manifest a prudential
desire to keep the state distant from religious teaching.46 But at a more
fundamental level, Adler exposes Canadian constitutional law's
awkwardness when claims to religious freedom are made in service of
the collective dimension of religious life.47 The deep logic of this
decision is that religious freedom is fundamentally about the right (in
this case) of an individual parent to ch6ose how to educate his or her
child. Cast in this light, the state's failure to fund religious schools in the
context of universally-mandated education does not impose a significant
burden on the enjoyment of this parent's rights; parents can individually
take steps to teach their children as they see fit.
If Canadian constitutional law's atomism were set aside and one
focused upon the centrality of a collective project of education in
creating and perpetuating religious community, the issue might assume
a different complexion. Perhaps an accessible system of community-
based education is essential to cultural integrity, including the
enjoyment of religion, conceived of as a collective and trans-
generational phenomenon. This is not to say that the result in Adler is
wrong or that the state ought to fund religious schools beyond those
45 Adler, supra note 43 at paras. 174-75.
46 For a discussion of the Canadian conception of "state neutrality" in the constitutional
protection of freedom of religion, and how it differs from the non-establishment tradition in the
United States, see Bruce Ryder, "State Neutrality and Freedom of Conscience and Religion"
(2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 169. See also David M. Brown, "Neutrality or Privilege? A
Comment on Religious Freedom" (2005) 29 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 221 at 229-35.
4 A similar awkwardness can be seen in the courts' treatment of claims to religious
freedom made by the Hutterite communities in Canada. See Alvin Esau, The Courts and the
Colonies: The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004); and Alvin
Esau, "Communal Property and Freedom of Religion: Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v.
Hofet" in John McLaren & Harold Coward, eds., Religious Conscience, the State, and the Law
(Albany: SUNY, 1999) 97. Esau's analysis demonstrates that, although in some cases the communal
property of the religious community was ultimately protected, the courts frequently relied upon
individualist contractual notions and concepts of individual natural justice quite extrinsic to the
community's traditions and self-conception. The courts' analytic focus seems irresistibly to return to
the individual religious adherent within a given group, rather than the group itself.
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guaranteed for historical reasons in the constitutional compact. Rather,
the point is an entirely descriptive one: when religion is set before the
bar of Charter rights, such considerations are not readily cognizable by
the law. These dimensions of religious life are filtered out by the
structure and commitments of contemporary constitutionalism.
From Big M to Amselem, the jurisprudence shows that, in its
deep logic, contemporary Canadian constitutionalism understands
religion as a phenomenon that is fundamentally located within the
individual and whose goods redound to the individual. In so doing,
important dimensions of religious culture may be obscured from the
analytic gaze of Canadian constitutionalism. Yet my argument is not
that law has "erred" in conceiving of religion in this way, at least not in a
way that is the product of a set of doctrinal defects amenable to a quick
jurisprudential fix. Rather, law is-quite naturally-viewing religion in
those terms indigenous and, therefore, sympathetic to this aspect of the
ideological structure of modern Canadian constitutional law. Otherwise
put, law's commitment to religion as fundamentally individual renders
religion in a highly digestible state for the purposes of modern, secular
constitutionalism, itself informed by liberal individualism.
III. LAW'S RELIGION AS EXPRESSION OF AUTONOMY
AND CHOICE
I have pointed to liberalism's commitment to the priority of the
individual as the ideological basis for law's individualistic rendering of
religion. But liberalism's commitment to the individual has aspects of
significance that ramify further into law's understanding of religion. The
basis for liberalism's focus on the individual is its commitment to the
goods of autonomy and individual liberty as the mechanism for human
flourishing. Liberalism understands the individual as best served when
left to his or her own devices and free to make his or her own choices,
unencumbered by contextual constraints. In particular, liberalism's
political culture emphasizes the need to free the individual from the
interference of its primary antagonist, the state.
Having isolated the individual as the entity of explanatory and
experiential priority, liberalism turns to the question of how to empower
this entity. In a fusion of Enlightenment individualism and Romantic
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authenticity, 48 liberalism takes the view that the individual is best able to
flourish when left to exercise free choice with respect to the good. On
this view of human flourishing, the obligations of the public are twofold:
first, not to interfere with individual autonomy and, second, to intervene
wherever free choice is constrained. Self-realization is the goal, and
autonomy is the mechanism. 49 This emphasis on individual autonomy at
the core of liberal political culture is the source of the negative
conception of liberty.5 Freedom is secured when the individual can
choose freely, and liberty inheres in being left alone. Any social-and, in
particular, state-actions that impair this autonomy are, by definition,
evils to be guarded against. So, within the liberal imagination, it is
impossible to disassociate the priority placed on the individual from the
ultimate valuation of autonomy and free choice.
In Canada, this liberal political culture of autonomy and choice
is reflected in the structures of constitutionalism. Charter rights are
essentially negative in their orientation, guaranteeing a sphere of
immunity from state action rather than requiring positive conduct on
the part of the state. Although, in recent years, certain notes sounding in
positive liberty have issued from the Court, such instances remain either
conceived of as exceptional, 5' or confined to dissenting opinions. 2 In
law's view, "[f]reedom can primarily be characterized by the absence of
coercion or constraint."53 Indeed, in defining the very concept of liberty
for the purposes of the Charter, the Court has articulated a thoroughly
negative conception that also demonstrates the centrality of autonomy
and choice to contemporary Canadian constitutional law:
'
8 See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
4' Taylor links this focus on choice to the contemporary liberal culture of authenticity,
noting that, with the attenuation of other horizons of meaning, "the ideal of self-determining
freedoms comes to exercise a more powerful attraction. It seems that significance can be conferred
by choice, by making my life an exercise in freedom, even when all other sources fail. Self-
determining freedom is in part the default solution of the culture of authenticity" (Taylor, Malaise
of Modernity, supra note 20 at 69).
so See Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty" in Robert E. Goodin & Philip Pettit, eds.,
Contemporary Political Philosophy(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997) 391.
tDunmore v. Ontario (A.G.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016.
s Gosselin v. Ouebec (A.G.), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429, Arbour J., dissenting.
s Big M, supra note 17 at para. 95: "If a person is compelled by the state or the will of
another to a course of action or inaction which he would not otherwise have chosen, he is not acting
of his own volition and he cannot be said to be truly free."
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[L]iberty does not mean mere freedom from physical restraint. In a free and democratic
society, the individual must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or her own life
and to make decisions that are of fundamental personal importance.54
The centrality of autonomy, in the form of unencumbered choice, to the
Canadian legal imagination is reflected in the fact that the Court has
inscribed autonomy as one of those "Charter values"--essentially
constitutional grundnorms-that subtend the whole of the rights-protecting
instrument and must be considered in making all legal decisions."
When cast within this constitutional context, religion quite
naturally takes on a shape consistent with its mould. Having defined
religion in the individualist terms discussed above, the majority in
Amselem turns to explain the principled basis for the protection of
religion. Freedom of religion, the majority asserts, "revolves around the
notion of personal choice and individual autonomy and freedom."56
Religion is to be protected by the law because it is "integrally linked with
an individual's self-definition and fulfillment and is a function of personal
autonomy and choice."57 On this view, the value of religion inheres in the
fact that it is one of many possible options that individuals might select as
an aspect of his or her self-definition and authentic experience. The evil
of interfering in religious beliefs and practices is that to do so would
54 R.B. v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 [ Children's Aid
Socieoy at para. 80, La Forest J. See also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at para. 230, Wilson J:
Thus, an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which the Charter is founded is the right to
make fundamental personal decisions without interference from the state. This right is a critical
component of the right to liberty. Liberty, as was noted in Singh, is a phrase capable of a broad range
of meaning. In my view, this right, properly construed, grants the individual a degree of autonomy in
making decisions of fundamental personal importance.
'
5Autonomy is listed in the jurisprudence as "a fundamental value reflected in our society's
Constitution or similar fundamental laws, like bills of rights." R. v. Labaye, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 728 at
para. 33. In Health Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British
Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 at para. 81, Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel state: "Human
dignity, equality, liberty, respect for the autonomy of the person and the enhancement of
democracy are among the values that underly the Charter," which was explained at para. 80, that
"[t]he Charter ... should be interpreted in a way that maintains its underlying values." In Hill v.
Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at para. 92, the Court states: "the Charter represents a
restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our democratic society and our legal
system." It is, thus, appropriate to consider these "Charter values" as a species of Kelsen's
grundnorm, understood as "the postulated ultimate rule according to which the norms of [a legal]
order are established and annulled, receive and lose their validity." Hans Kelsen, General Theory
of Law and State, trans. by Anders Wedberg (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961) at 114.
'
6Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 40.
'
7Ibid at para. 42 [emphasis added].
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constrain freedom and liberty. Religion is cast as one possible component
of the autonomous life and, concomitantly, is essentially conceived of as a
choice. As the majority states, "[t]he emphasis ... is on personal choice of
religious beliefs."58 Law understands religion as a product of choice and,
hence, as connected to the liberty and autonomy of the subject.
This aspect of law's rendering of religion also appears in
Amselem in the dissenting judges' reasoning. Justice Binnie, writing for
himself, focussed his attention on the fact that the claimants had
voluntarily bound themselves to the terms of the contract and,
therefore, could not fairly invoke their religious liberties. In this
reasoning, religion stands as equivalent to geography and aesthetics,
both subjects of autonomous choice in the selection of a home. If the
appellants were unencumbered in their choice of this building then, in
compliance with the logic of autonomy and self-determination, the
choice cannot be interfered with even if to do so would be in the name
of religious liberties. "It was for the appellants ... to determine in
advance of their unit purchase what the appellants' particular
religious beliefs required. They had a choice of buildings in which to
invest."59 In the end, putting up a succah is a choice to be analyzed
against other choices like hanging a garden trellis or opting for
satellite television over cable.
This conception of the protection of religious belief as centrally
concerned with individual autonomy and choice was inscribed at the
foundation of Charter jurisprudence on freedom of religion with Big M
In finding that the Sunday closing law at issue was unconstitutional, the
Court ruled that the legislation did not have a secular purpose but, rather,
"binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal."60 According to Justice Dickson,
the essential constitutional infirmity was that the impugned Act "works a
form of coercion inimical to the sprit of the Charter," 61 a spirit that is
centrally concerned with ensuring equality and freedom. "The essence of
the concept of freedom of religion," wrote Justice Dickson, "is the right to
58 Ibid. See also Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's dissent in Adler, supra note 43, in which she
states at para. 72 that "s. 2(a) of the Charter is primarily concerned with the necessary limits to be
placed on the state in its potentially coercive interference with the original, objectively perceived
religious 'choice' that individuals make.".
I9lbid., at para. 185.
'Big M, supra note 17 at para. 97.
61 Ibid.
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entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses., 6 2 On this view,
protecting autonomy is the core element of religious liberty, and
autonomy is secured by ensuring an absence of coercion or restraint. In
Justice Dickson's words, "whatever else freedom of conscience and
religion may mean, it must at the least mean this: government may not
coerce individuals to affirm a specific religious belief or to manifest a
specific religious practice for a sectarian purpose."63 Indeed, this anti-
coercion or "protection of autonomy" core of religious freedom was
reaffirmed in the Reference re Same-Sex Marriage,' in which the Court
held that, although the proposed same-sex marriage legislation was
constitutionally sound, any state compulsion of religious officials to
perform such marriages would offend section 2(a) of the Charter because
it would interfere with "the right to believe and entertain the religious
beliefs of one's choice."65 Since Big M the clear and consistent
jurisprudential message has been that religion has constitutional
relevance because it is an expression of human autonomy and choice.
This logic of autonomy is similarly deployed in Canadian
decisions regarding school prayer. Zylberberg v. Sudbury Board of
Education (Director),66 involved a claim by three parents-one
Jewish, one Muslim, and one non-practicing Christian-who
challenged an Ontario Regulation requiring that schools open or
close each day with a reading from the Christian Scriptures and a
recitation of the Lord's Prayer. The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed
and self-consciously reflected on the evolution of constitutional
thought about the nature of religion:
In an earlier time, when people believed in the collective responsibility of the community
toward some deity, the enforcement of religious conformity may have been a legitimate
object of government, but since the Charter, it is no longer legitimate. With the Charter,
it has become the right of every Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or
her religious obligations, if any, should be ... 67
Ibid. at para. 94.
6 Ibid. at para. 123.
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.
6 Ibid. at para. 57. The Court went on to suggest that such an infringement would likely be
unjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter.
-(1988), 65 O.R. (2d) 641 (Ont. C.A.) [Zylberber].
6 Big M, supra note 17 at para. 135. Quoted at ibid. at 589.
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No longer a matter of collective or community concern, religious
practice has, in the eyes of the law, been decentralized into an
expression of individual autonomy. The constitutional defect in this
legislation was its coercive nature, interfering as it did with the right of
each individual to make choices about religious observance. Indeed, this
was so despite the existence of an "opt-out" clause in the legislation,
which allowed a parent to claim an exemption from any religious
exercises. The court reasoned that the appearance of choice here was
illusory, and that the true effect of this exclusion clause was a
"compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the majority."68
The court demonstrated its deep sensitivity to possible constraints on
free choice by noting that the exemption is unlikely to be exercised given
"the fact that children are disinclined at this age to step out of line or to
flout 'peer-group norms."'69 The clear concern of the law is to protect
religion as an expression of choice. Any factor-legal or contextual-
that might interfere with the autonomy-based core of religious freedom
is suspect in the eyes of contemporary constitutionalism. The courts
have similarly held that religious education in public schools can be
problematic because "teaching students Christian doctrine as if it were
the exclusive means through which to develop moral thinking and
behaviour amounts to religious coercion in the class-room."7 The issue
is not the separation of church and state per se, but a concern for the
autonomy of the child.
Big M and Zylberberg are particularly interesting cases
displaying law's rendering of religion because both cases draw out a
seeming tension between the centrality of autonomy and choice, which I
have been emphasizing, and the presence of language and reasoning
that appears to invoke notions of equality and, with it, identity. There
has always been a note of equality language in the Supreme Court's
section 2(a) jurisprudence. Themes of equality seem to emerge in places
where the Court speaks of the communicative harm done by favouring
68 Zylberberg, ibid. at 591.
69 ibid.
' Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Ontario (Minister of Education) (1990), 71 OR.
(2d) 341 (Ont. C.A.) [CCLA] at 363 [emphasis added]. The court went on (at 364) to note that its
basis for concluding that s. 2(a) had been offended is "probably best summed up" by Justice
Dickson's comments in Big M, supra note 17 at para. 135, that "it has become the right of every
Canadian to work out for himself or herself what his or her religious obligations, if any, should be."
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one religion over another, even where the interference with the
autonomy of the religious claimant is less than clear. Both Big M and
Zylberberg are examples of such cases. In addition to describing a free
society as one in which fundamental freedoms are equally enjoyed,
Chief Justice Dickson in Big M described the harm of the Sunday
closing legislation as follows: "In proclaiming the standards of the
Christian faith, the Act creates a'climate hostile to, and gives the
appearance of discrimination against, non-Christian Canadians."72
Similarly, in Zylberberg the Court spoke of the school prayer, despite its
provision to opt-out, as "depreciat[ing] the position of religious
minorities, 73 and "stigmatizing [students] as non-conformists and setting
them apart from their fellow students who are members of the dominant
religion. '' 74 Again, there are notes in this language that seem to sound in
the register of equality.
In some respects, this language of equality appears to be in
tension with the focus on autonomy and choice described in this section.
In the language of equality there is a seeming invocation of conceptions
of cultural identity rather than autonomy: equality logic is about
protection from identity-based harms. It might be thought, therefore,
that when the Court invokes the language or logic of equality in its
section 2(a) cases, it is appealing to a sense of religion as a cultural or
identity-based concept rather than the autonomy-centred phenomenon
that I have argued is at the centre of the Court's treatment of religion.
With the language of equality, the message seems more that religion as
an aspect of one's identity is what is of central concern to the law.
There is no doubt that there is some dimension of religious
freedom that has a cultural or identity-based component. Most simply,
religion is not merely a choice like any other; not all choices are treated
with the constitutional protection that religion enjoys. 75 My claim is not
that Canadian law's understanding of religion is bereft of a cultural or
identity-based dimension. However the work that "identity" does in
Big M, supra note 17 at paras. 94-95.
72 Ibid. at para. 97. The concern in Edwards Books, supra note 38, with competitive
disadvantage occasioned by preferential treatment of one religion over another similarly evokes
equality-based themes.
7  Zylberberg, supra note 66 at 592.
74 Ibid.
7 On this point see Moon, supra note 13.
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Canadian adjudicative culture is comparatively light, and this holds true
not only for religion, but also for the constitutional guarantee of equality.
As others have argued, although the concept of listed and analogous
grounds in section 15 of the Charter might have been used to emphasize
the significance of identity as an indispensable dimension of legal
equality, the law has substantially denuded those grounds of potential
analytic force or substantive meaning in the equality analysis itself.76
Similarly, recent cases have shown that the aspects of the test enunciated
in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)77 that
might have promised some contextual assessment of the socially-
embedded complexities of identity politics, such as the historical
disadvantage test, have been marginalized,78 and "choice" has become the
dominant juridical concept in governing constitutional equality.79 Under
the prevailing interpretation of constitutional equality, the wrong of
discrimination is state-imposed disadvantage based on identity traits
rather than based on autonomous choices. Dignity, the' lodestar of
equality, is affected when the government treats an individual as other
than an autonomous chooser. As the Court stated in Law and has since
reinforced, in law's understanding, "the equality guarantee in s. 15(1) is
concerned with the realization of personal autonomy and self-
determination. 80 That there has been some legal statement made about
the value of your identity gets you in the section 15 door; once there,
however, the analytic force of the identity judgment is largely spent.
76 Dianne Pothier, "Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People's Real
Experiences" (2001) 13:1 C.J.W.L. 37. On the way in which the "grounds" analysis has become
(particularly after Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
203) an impediment to, rather than enriching of, the analysis of substantive equality, see Lessard,
supra note 5 at 190--91.
-[1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 [Law].
' See Trociuk v.-British Columbia (A.G.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 835 and Lessard, supra note 5.
' Diana Majury, "Women are Themselves to Blame: Choice as a Justification for Unequal
Treatment" in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights
Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) 209; Hester
Lessard, "Charter Gridlock: Equality Formalism and Marriage Fundamentalism" in Sheila
McIntyre & Sandra Rodgers eds., Diminishing Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (Markham: LexisNexis, 2006) 291.
o Law, supra note 77 at para. 53. This understanding of the gravamen of equality was
clearly displayed in Nova Scotia (A.G.) v. Walsh, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325, in which the Court's finding
that there was no breach of section 15(1) turned on the majority's conclusion that the distinction in
question was calibrated to the claimant's choices and, as such, "respects the fundamental personal
autonomy and dignity of the individual" (at para. 62).
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The same is true of concepts of equality and identity in religious
freedoms. The law sometimes invokes a sense of religion as protected
because of some link to identity, but when one moves to the next
question about why we want to protect individuals from identity-based
mistreatment or harm, the answer collapses the focus back onto
conceptions of autonomy and choice. Although the jurisprudence
sometimes evokes notions of equality, and hence identity, one cannot
stop there. Just as the "identity" aspect of equality has been eclipsed by
the concept of choice, the. equality/identity aspect of religion is
ultimately little more than a marker for a particularly valued
manifestation of choice.81 In both cases-in equality and in religion-
law's central concern is to treat the individual fairly as an autonomous
choosing agent. Identity itself is valued because it is an expression of
who the subject wants to be and to become. So when, in its religion
cases, the Court invokes language and approaches that sound in
equality, this does not represent a break from the focus on autonomy
and choice that I have described; rather, it is the same concern
expressed from a different angle. To send the message that someone is
less worthy of regard on the basis of his or her religious identity is to fail
to respect a choice particularly close to their autonomousself-definition.
In this way, although there is a natural note of identity in law's.
understanding of religion, the major tone turns out always to be the
liberal focus on choice and autonomy.82
The strength of law's rendering of religion as centrally about
autonomy and choice emerges most clearly when one looks to cases in
which the quality of the religious subject's autonomy or capacity for
choice is somehow in question. Liberalism, and the legal structures that
it inspires, has great difficulty with claims to autonomy and personal
freedom made by children, the elderly, and the ill or disabled. Law's
conception of liberty is centred on free choice and, for these individuals,
the law often fears that the choice is not truly free. 3 If choice is not truly
8! This point is made clearly in Adler, supra note 43 at para. 208, when McLachlin J. (as she
then was) states: "The essence of s. 15 is that the state cannot use choices like the choice of religion
as the basis for denying the equal protection and benefit of the law."
82 As the Court says in Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 43: "The emphasis ... is on
personal choice of religious beliefs" [emphasis added].
' A large and interesting question is under what conditions law is prepared to question the
freedom of a given choice. I have identified age and disability as classic bases upon which the law
begins to question the quality of a given choice, but perhaps the most contentious current point of
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free, then the authenticity of autonomy is imperilled and all bets are off.
Thus, given an understanding of religion as choice, if the genuineness of
the choice is in question, the force of religion's claim dissipates in the
legal imagination. Take, for example, Canadian jurisprudence regarding
the right to refuse life-saving blood transfusions on the basis of religious
objection. It is clear that a capable adult is entitled to make such a
decision. This is a choice so clearly within the protected realm of
personal autonomy that law can make no move to limit the decision, no
matter how fundamentally general public attitudes might conflict with
this choice. Indeed, to fail to comply with these wishes is viewed by law
as an actionable wrong.' 4 When the patient is a child, however, the
discourse of choice and autonomy shifts and is instead deployed against
the claims that religion might make.
Such was the case in Children's Aid Society,85 in which the Court
accepted the sincerity of the parents' convictions that led to their
decision not to permit a blood transfusion for their child, but
unanimously held that the Charter did not ultimately protect this
manifestation of religious belief.86 One set of reasons shows the strength
of law's conception of religion as choice. Justices Iacobucci and Major
reasoned that the child had only been born into the religion and had
"never expressed any agreement with the Jehovah's Witness faith."87
Respect for the child's autonomy meant that she had "the right to live
long enough to make [her] own reasoned choice about the religion
[she] wishes to follow as well as the right not to hold a religious
belief."88 As compared to the case of the refusing adult, the individual
whose-autonomy is in question is now not able to exercise choice, and
this makes all the difference in the eyes of the law. The point is not
that the decision should be otherwise. The point is to appreciate that
debate is the relationship between culture itself and choice. For an insightful discussion of this
theme arising from the recent debate on the place of Shari'a law in Ontario family arbitration, see
Natasha Bakht, Arbitration, Religion and Family Law: Private Justice on the Backs of Women
(Ottawa: National Association of Women and the Law, 2005) at 17-20.
See e.g. Mallette v. Shulman (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 417 (C.A.).
s Supra note 54.
The majority reasoned that freedom of religion had been offended, but that it was a
justified infringement under section 1 of the Charter.
7 Supra note 54 at para. 231.
ss Ibid.
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religion has force in the eyes of the law to the extent that it is aligned
with autonomy and choice."
Since Big M, the clear and consistent jurisprudential message
has been that religion has constitutional relevance because it is an
expression of human autonomy and choice. Law understands religion
as an aspect of personal self-fulfillment. Religion is essentially
individual and, correlatively, has its force in law because it is an
expression of liberty through choice. Recognizing law's religion as
personal and important owing to its nature as preference leads us to a
final, and deeply interrelated, feature of law's rendering of religion:
law assigns religion clearly, albeit unstably, to the realm of the private
rather than to the public.
IV. LAW'S RELIGION AS PRIVATE
The political culture of liberalism sees meaning as the exclusive
concern of the private. Meaning is aligned with preference and choice
and, given the commitment to robust autonomy as the path to authentic
choice, meaning is something that must be sought and embraced within
the private sphere. The quintessential domains of interest in liberal
thought are the market, the family, and religion. Thes& are private
domains in which we are governed in our actions and dispositions not by
the universalism of reason but by the particularities of love, preference,
and belief. The role of the public, by contrast, is simply to create a set of
procedural conditions that will guarantee sufficient autonomy and to
remain agnostic as to the good-as to meaning. This is the essence of
the "view from nowhere"9 and theorizing about the "original
position."91 The point is to banish interest and preference from the
realm of public debate, which is instead consecrated to reason. Despite
the range of liberal political theories, this feature-the assignment of
choice and interest to the realm of the private and a commitment to
89 Another illuminating recent example comes from SJB. (Litigation Guardian of) v.
British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Service) (2005), 42 B.C.L.R. (4th)
321, in which the court held that an almost 15 year old girl who did not wish to receive a life-saving
blood transfusion on the basis of her Jehovah's Witness faith was nevertheless required to receive
the treatment.
See Thomas Nagel, The Viewffrom Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
01 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1971).
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keeping the public agnostic as to meaning-is remarkably constant.92 As
Paul Kahn writes, what ultimately characterizes the political culture of
liberalism is that it "aims to establish a framework of just rules that
operate as conditions within which individuals must make their own
choices about meaning.
' 93
Kahn explains that the public/private divide that is so central to
liberalism is, in essence, a metaphor for the dividing line between reason
and choice or preference. That which is public must be governed by
reason.94 When choice and preference enter the picture, we have shifted
into the private, and reason is no longer the governing principle. Thus,
political liberalism understands the scope of the claims that the state can
make on the individual as being confined to reasonable demands. If the
public begins to present itself in a way that manifests interest or choice
as among reasonable alternatives, it acts without legitimacy.
Canadian constitutional law expresses this commitment to a
durable divide between the private and the public, as well as the criteria
that set these borders, through a number of its doctrines and features.
The doctrine of applicability means that the Charter binds only
government decision-making and leaves the realm of the private to
regulation through other mechanisms. 95 Furthermore, a. person's
enjoyment of his or her Charter rights varies depending on whether the
particular activity in question is a private or public act; specifically,
reason will have a greater limiting claim on public conduct. The
constitutional protection of privacy reflects the importance of this
distinction. For example, within the framework of constitutional logic,
the right to privacy protected in sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, which is
fundamentally a right to the integrity of one's private domain, is
9 Kahn, supra note 14 at 123: "Arguments among competing conceptions of liberalism are
arguments over the location of the border of the public and the private, that is, over the point at
which there is a crossing from reason to unreason."
93 Ibid. at 116.
9 Kahn describes this as liberalism's own imperial ambition-to claim the whole domain of
reason and, thereby, to occupy the whole field of public values. Ibid. at 120.
95 For a discussion of the impact of doctrines of applicability on rights constitutionalism, see
Gavin W. Anderson, "Social Democracy and the Limits of Rights Constitutionalism" (2004) 17
Can. J.L. & Jur. 31. Anderson demonstrates that even broader doctrines of rights applicability than
that found in the Charter end up replicating this private/public distinction so deeply ingrained in
the culture of political liberalism.
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essential because it protects a sphere of autonomy.96 One's liberty within
this sphere of autonomy allows the pursuit of personal interests, the
making of personal choices, and the development of one's own sense of
the good. The boundary between this sphere and the public is, however,
policed by the logic of reasonableness: one's expectation of privacy must
be a reasonable one, and ones interests and choices must be acted upon
in a reasonable manner, specifically in a manner that gives due regard to
the parallel rights of others. In these ways, Canadian constitutionalism
expresses liberal political culture's sense of the public and private as the
domains of reason and interest, respectively.
Again, it ought to come as no surprise that, when it turns its
analytic gaze to the phenomenon of religion, Canadian constitutional
law, itself informed by liberal political culture's commitments, views
religion in a manner that comports with the taxonomy of public/private
and reason/interest. The primary way in which we see this rendering
manifest in Amselem, and in other cases, is in the assertion that religion
is fundamentally a question of belief. Religion is defined as "freely and
deeply held personal convictions and beliefs."97 The rhetorical focus on
belief is not without complication. In places, the Court speaks of the
importance of religious practice,98 going so far as to note that "[t]he
performance of religious rites is a fundamental aspect of religious
practice."99 Although the Court does not entirely blind itself to the
practiced or lived dimension of religion, close attention to the
jurisprudence demonstrates that law manifests a degree of comfort with
religion as belief and displays a kind of anxiety and awkwardness with
religion as practice. These respective reactions to belief and practice fit
comfortably within the liberal framework of constitutional rights. When a
belief is made manifest in conduct, its presence as a expression in the
world pushes it closer to-or into-the public and, in so doing, threatens
the introduction of interest and preference into the realm of reason.
SR. v. Tessling, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 at para. 15: "Building upon the foundation laid by the
common law, s. 8 of the Charter creates for '[e]veryone' certain areas of personal autonomy where
'all the forces of the Crown' cannot enter." (Quoting William Pitt (the Elder) in a 1763 speech
before Parliament, reproduced in Lord H. Brougham, Historical Sketches of Statesmen Who
Flourished in the Time of George 111(1855), vol. I, at 42.)
9 7Amselem, supra note 11 at para. 39 [emphasis added]. See also Big M supra note 17 at
paras. 94-95.
See Big M ibid.; Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 64 at paras. 56-59.
Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, ibid. at para. 57.
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Law's comfort with religion as belief and discomfort with
religion as (potentially public) practice appears clearly in Trinity
Western,1 °° which considered Trinity Western University's requirement
that all students sign a code of conduct that, among other things,
prohibited certain practices "that are biblically condemned," including
"homosexual behaviour."1 °1 Since this code expressed a discriminatory
view, the British Columbia College of Teachers (BCCT) refused to certify
the University's education program, thus preventing its graduates from
serving as public school teachers. The BCCT's refusal was based, at least
in part, on its conclusion that students who signed such a code of
conduct must have held the belief that homosexual conduct was
immoral. Public teachers, the BCCT reasoned, were required to uphold
and teach the principles of equality and non-discrimination, and there
was no reasonable prospect that a student who signed this code of
conduct could be relied upon to carry out these public responsibilities:
The Court held that the apparent conflict between equality and
religious freedom would be avoided by "properly defining the scope of
the rights"1"2 involved. In this case, "the proper place to draw the line ...
is generally between belief and conduct."1 3 Why? The scope of law's
protection for conduct is narrower precisely because, once implemented
in action, beliefs take on a more public aspect. The Court concluded
that the BCCT had improperly based its ruling on the "mere" presence of
a religious belief, rather than upon evidence that such belief translated
into discriminatory conduct in the public realm. Even if the code of
conduct was an accurate insight into the beliefs held by the graduates of
Trinity Western University, the constitutional ethics of equal treatment
and non-discrimination are concerned with public conduct, and the
Court was not prepared to predict future conduct based on past
evidence of belief. In so ruling, the Court effectively translated the issue
into an evidentiary matter, but one that discloses the strong manner in
which the constitutional imagination associates religion with the realm
of the private. As belief only, religion is a preference that remains
solidly and unproblematically within the realm of the personal. Once
'o Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 S.C.R.
772 [Trinity Western].
101 As cited in ibid. at para. 4.
o Ibid. at para. 29.
J02 Ibid. at para. 36.
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released into action, however, it might seep into the realm of the public
where interest and preference have a troublesome status.
Law's sense of the rightful presence of the private in the public
is, of course, complicated. For example, the status of interest and
preference as legitimate aspects of public decision-making varies with
context. Accordingly, law's understanding of religion as private has
complex implications for the place of religion in the public sphere."0 At
one end of the spectrum, the justifiability of the influence of religion on
the way in which an individual casts his or her ballot is hardly
questioned. One might disagree with the religious principles brought to
bear, or whether the voter ought to be a religious person, but the idea
that religious beliefs can legitimately influence voting is not generally in
question. At the other end of the spectrum, from within the
contemporary imagination of the Canadian constitutional rule of law, it
would seem anathema to have a judge reason from religious principles
in a decision about the validity of a contract or the appropriate division
of matrimonial assets upon divorce. Somewhere in the middle, and most
contested, is the rightful place of religious principle in representative
decision-making. 5 Should a Prime Minister be informed by his or her
religious views when making policy decisions? Although the current
tendency in Canada is to reject such a role for private religion,"°6 there is
a broader spectrum of opinion on this point. So my claim is not that,
within the Canadian constitutional rule of law, religion has no place in
the public; rather, law's rendering of religion as belief strongly aligns it
with the private and, given legal liberalism's commitment to the
o David Seljak provides an interesting example of the complexity of religion's role in
Canadian public decision making, noting that "[in both the 1980 and 1995 referenda, Catholic
groups attempted to redefine a public role for the Church in Quebec society." David Seljak,
"Resisting the 'No Man's Land' of Private Religion: The Catholic Church and Public Politics in
Quebec" in David Lyon & Marguerite Van Die, eds., Rethinking Church, State, and Modernity:
Canada Between Europe and America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000) 131 at 144.
Seljak notes further at 145 that these groups' "attempts at the 'deprivatization' of religion take the
form of resistance to the dominant political culture, which would relegate both religion and
alternative ethical perspectives to the 'private' realm of subjective values and experiences."
'
05 For an argument in defence of reliance upon religious beliefs in public decision-making
see Michael J. Perry, "Why Political Reliance on Religiously Grounded Morality is not Illegitimate
in a Liberal Democracy" (2001) 36 Wake Forest L. Rev. 217.
'0"The stance taken by Prime Ministers Jean Chrdtien and Paul Martin (both Catholics) on
same-sex marriage are cases in point. Both disavowed the legitimacy of basing the decision on
legalizing same-sex marriage on Catholic dogma, and this in spite of Papal encyclicals calling upon
public decision makers to do just this.
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public/private divide, this association creates identifiable tensions for
law's treatment of public expressions of religious commitment.
An example of this complex role for religion-as-interest in public
decision making is Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 361'0 In
this case, the Court quashed the decision of a School Board that,
influenced by the existence of religious objections to same-sex
relationships among the parents in the community, refused to approve
the use of books that depicted same-sex parented families for a
Kindergarten/Grade One curriculum. The Board's decision was
challenged on the ground that, by deferring to certain religious views in
the community, it had acted contrary to section 76 of its enabling
legislation, which required that all schools be conducted on "strictly
secular and non-sectarian principles."' 10
8
The Court rejected an interpretation of this demand for
"secularism" that would prohibit religious concerns from informing the
Board's decision-making altogether. Instead, the section meant that, if
the Board gave credence to the religious views in the community, it had
to ensure that it did so "in a manner that gives equal recognition and
respect to other members of the community."" ° The Court explained
that the role of the Board as a public decision-maker and the role of
parents were manifestly different. Whereas individual parents are
entitled to advocate for policies that are consonant with their religious
views, u °O as an elected body exercising powers pursuant to public
legislation, the Board "must not allow itself to be dominated by one
religious or moral point of view, but must respect a diversity of views. '
Critically, the Board must also be subject to judicial review for the
reasonableness of its decisions. In this case, the Court found that the
107 [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 [Chamberlain].
'0o School Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 412, s. 76. The board's decision was also challenged on
Chartergrounds, but the Court disposed of the case based on administrative law principles.
"o Chamberlain, supra note 107 at para. 19. For a discussion of the meaning of the term
"secularism," see Berger, "Limits of Belief" supra note 7. Cf lain T. Benson, "Considering
Secularism" in Douglas Farrow, ed., Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society (Montreal &
Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004) [Farrow] 83 and lain T. Benson, "Notes towards
a (re)definition of the 'secular"' (2000) 33:3 U.B.C. L. Rev. 519. See also Douglas Farrow, "Of
Secularity and Civil Religion" in Farrow 140.
"o Chamberlain, ibid. at para. 20: "Parents need not abandon their own commitments, or
their view that the practices of others are undesirable."
I"" Ibid. at para. 28.
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Board's decision was unreasonable, in part on the basis that it had
deferred to the particular religious views of certain parents without
considering the multiplicity of views that might be represented in the
community, as mandated by the School Act's requirement for
secularity.112 The underlying dynamic at play in this case is one in which,
when anchored in the private, law is unconcerned with the existence of
religious preference; however, when wielded by public authority, law is
less comfortable with religion and requires that it be tested against the
dictates of reason. As private religion becomes increasingly associated
with the sphere of public decision-making, it leaves the permissive
jurisdiction of interest and enters the scrutinizing domain of reason.
Amselem further dramatizes the role of the public and private as
symbolic markers for the distinction between interest and reason, as well
as law's assignation of religion to the realm of the private/interest. One
of the important issues in Amselem was how to determine whether a
claimant's religious belief is cognizable by law. Specifically, the question
was whether the Court needed to decide whether or not the claimants
were correct in their belief that Judaism required a personal, rather than
a communal, succah. The majority reasoned that it would be
inconsistent with law's commitment to individual autonomy (and here
we see the interaction among all three elements of law's vision of
religion) "to rule on the validity or veracity of a given religious practice
or belief." '113 Instead, the courts should confine themselves to
determining whether or not the claimant "is sincere in his or her
belief.""' 4  Reflecting this distinction back on the public/private
dichotomy, it becomes apparent that veracity has no place in the realm
of interest-all that matters is the sincerity of one's preference. If this
test is satisfied, analysis in the private realm is, for law's purposes,
exhausted. By contrast, truth is the ultimate test in the realm of reason.
112 Ibid. at paras. 57-59.
"
3 Amselem, supra note 11 at para 51.
"1 Ibid. at para. 56. This approach was confirmed in Multani v. Commission scolaire
Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256. Paraphrasing Amselem, Charron J. summarized the
analytical approach under section 2(a) of the Charterat para. 34:
in order to establish that his or her freedom of religion has been infringed, the claimant must
demonstrate (1) that he or she sincerely believes in a practice or belief that has a nexus with religion,
and (2) that the impugned conduct of a third party interferes, in a manner that is non-trivial or not
insubstantial, with his or her ability to act in accordance with that practice or belief.
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If true, a proposition binds all reasonable persons. Veracity is for the
public, sincerity is for the private, and all that the law requires of
religion is sincerity of belief. Within law's imagination, religion takes on
a strong sense of "interest," and a concomitant association with the
private, such that an inquiry into truth does not fit comfortably.
Even the dissents in Amselem betray law's rendering of religion
as, in deep ways, a matter of private interest. Justices Bastarache and
Binnie both argue that the law must take cognizance, not only of the
claimants' religious interests, but of the other owners' property rights,
with Justice Binnie arguing that the claimants had lost their religious
rights when they signed the contract. The contractual terms "express a
certain style of architectural austerity or collective anonymity which the
co-owners wanted to present to the world in a building shorn of any
external display of individual personality. ' .. To vindicate the religious
right without regard to these aesthetic preferences would be to privilege
one form of interest (belief) over another (aesthetic taste), and law,
which honours the border between private and public, is extremely
reticent to do so. This reasoning casts religion as a fungible interest,
interchangeable through the market with other preferences. I am not
suggesting that law treats religion as nothing more than any other
interest. The Charter explicitly protects religious freedom, whereas it
only obliquely protects other interests such as aesthetic taste. 116 Yet
when rendered by the constitutional rule of law, religion takes on a
strong sense of private interest, and this colouring affects the way that
the jurisprudence treats religion; specifically, religion is drawn away
from the realm of culture and into the realm of preference.
There is, of course, a strong connection between law's sense of
religion as centrally a matter of individual autonomy and the translation
of religious commitment into matters of preference, a link recognized as
early as by Justice Dickson (as he then was) in Big M "7 Religion is to
be protected because it is the object of individual choice, and this
element of choice is the means by which each individual gains the
capacity to seek the satisfaction of private interest and preference.
Canadian constitutionalism is committed to the view that "[a] truly free
"
5
sAmselem, ibid. at para. 195.
'
16 One could locate such oblique protections in the protection of freedom of expression, or even
in the guarantee that liberty will not be interfered with except in accordance with fundamental justice.
"
7 See Big M, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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society is one which can accommodate a wide variety of beliefs, diversity
of tastes and pursuits, customs and codes of conduct... 8 Religion has a
claim within the law, then, because it is an autonomous and private
expression of one important set of preferred tastes and chosen pursuits.
When pushed through the filter of Canadian constitutional law, religion
comes out in a shape easily assimilated into a distinction critical to the
liberal political imagination: religion is quintessentially private.
V. SUMMARY: LAW'S TRIPTYCH
As I have presented it, Canadian constitutional law's image of
religion has three aspects. The first is that within law's imagination
religion is something that essentially and most purely takes place within
the individual. Viewed through the lens of constitutional jurisprudence,
religion appears as a personal connection between the individual in her
solitude and whatever it is that forms the object of her spiritual
attention. When we ask why this commitment to the individual locus of
religion is so strong in the law, we see that this conception feeds off the
central philosophical commitment about the good that religion
represents. Religion is valuable and deserving of legal protection
because it is one possible expression of personal autonomy; that is, to
protect religion is to protect the right of an individual to make choices
about his or her spiritual life. On this view, religious freedom is a
necessary outgrowth of a more general dedication to the good of
freedom and autonomy. The relationship between this sense of religion
as centrally about autonomy and choice, and religion as a fundamentally
individual phenomenon, is apparent. We protect autonomy because we
privilege the individual; equally, the individual is valued because that
individual is the source of choice, which is understood as the expression
of freedom and autonomy. From these intimately interrelated aspects of
law's rendering of religion, the jurisprudence leads us naturally to the
third aspect of law's understanding of religion-that religion is a private
matter. Once religion is centred on the individual and his or her
personal choices and expressions of autonomy, the constitutional
imagination is led to assign religion to the realm of the private. The
relationship works equally in the opposite direction. Not an
independently legitimate component of public decision-making, religion
I" Ibid. at para. 94.
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falls on the private side of law's conceptual divide. Once so designated,
religion is bound not by reason, but by preference, and is therefore a
matter of choice and, as such, an expression of the autonomous
individual.
This is the triptych of religion painted by the brush of modern
Canadian constitutionalism. Like the artistic triptych, it can be described
structurally as being composed of three discrete panels. But, also like
the triptych, these three faces are really aspects of one larger image.
They combine to produce a coherent message, each informing the way
that we interpret the others. Although aspects of the jurisprudence
might emphasize one "panel" over the others, law's religion is only fully
appreciated when all of these aspects are viewed together.
By identifying these features as the aspects of religion relevant
to the legal imagination, we see that the resulting image circumscribes
religious experience within rather fixed boundaries. The outer frame
of the triptych is the limit of law's rendering of religion; the image
excludes even as it displays. But what accounts for what this particular
perception of religion omits and what it foregrounds? I have argued
that law's understanding of religion is informed by modern
Canadian constitutionalism's foundational assumptions and ideological
commitments. The focus on the individual as the elementary unit of
explanation, the privileging of autonomy and choice, and the fidelity to a
private/public taxonomy all make this particular rendering of religion
one that resonates with Canadian constitutional law's ideological
underpinnings. Law shapes religion in its own ideological image and
likeness and conceptually confines it to the individual, choice-centred,
and private dimensions of human life. This particular iconography
resonates within the meaningful and meaning-giving framework of
Canadian constitutional law, deeply informed as it is by the political.
culture of liberalism.
I can now identify and exploit an ambiguity in the question at
the centre of this article: is law's view of religion a cultural
understanding of religion? In one important sense the answer to the
question must be "yes." My analysis of law's rendering of religion shows
the cultural dimensions of law. Law seeks to understand religion in
terms that make sense within the horizon of significance endogenous to
law. Canadian constitutional law's understanding of religion is "cultural"
in the sense that it is demonstrative of the culture of Canadian
constitutional law, understood as the framework of symbolic meaning
out of which law makes sense of the world. In this respect, law's
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understanding of religion is cultural. But the corollary is that law
therefore processes religion in terms exogenous to religious cultures; in
so doing, it may fail to take seriously the meanings and structures of
significance of religions as cultures. In this sense law's is not a cultural
understanding of religion. It does not seek to understand religion as an
interpretive horizon, composed of sets of symbols and categories of
thought, out of which meaning can be given to identity,- history, and
experience. Instead, it moulds religion to the shape of its own set of
normative and symbolic commitments.
One might object that I am asking too much of -law by
questioning whether its approach to religion is cultural. Perhaps law is
not excluding the cultural dimension at all but, rather, remaining
agnostic on this question. Otherwise put, is law actually defining
religion-making a claim about what religion is-or is law simply
dealing with religion in the terms necessary for adjudication and
withdrawing from any essential claim about the nature of religion? In
my analysis, I seem to make the greater claim that law is actually
asserting something about the true nature of that which it is protecting:
that it is making a sociological determination about what religion is. But
perhaps law merely takes a slice of religion-only that which is
necessary to answer the question before it-and leaves open a whole set
of issues about the nature of religion for others to answer. That is, it
does not speak to the social, identity-based, or public facets of religion
because those aspects are not at issue in a court of law and, therefore,
law leaves these other aspects to be worked out and spoken to by other
disciplines and other social institutions. Just as the law might not deny
(or confirm) that language has a socially constructive dimension when
deciding a language rights case, why would I assume that law's rendering
of religion is a comprehensive claim about the very nature of religion?
There is some truth in this critique. Canadian constitutional law
might not understand itself as making the larger claim about the very
nature of religion at large. Law begins from the premise that it is only
making the first claim-that it is merely concerned with that slice of
religion necessary to decide the case before it and is quite happy to
allow other understandings of religion to flourish. But law's modesty is
always false. Because law defines rights and uses power and violence to
enforce its vision, its claim rapidly assumes the greater form-the
comprehensive claim about religion. Because it both commands the
coercive power of the state and always implicitly assumes the ultimacy of
its authority, law's rendering of religion assumes the force and
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significance of a total claim about what matters about religion, what
religion relevantly is. This is the essence of Robert Cover's insight that
law is jurispathic: that, whether it intends to or not, the very nature of
law is that it kills other normative arrangements and interpretations." 9
This is the reason that law's rendering of religion matters so much when
discussing the nature of the relationship between law and religion: even
when it begins with a modest claim, the nature of law and its violence is
such that its claims quickly expand into a more comprehensive form.
Cover calls this law's jurispathic character; I would perhaps call it
epistemologically colonial-it may be that law is only saying that it is
making a limited claim about religion for its own purposes, but when the
courts are called upon to adjudicate upon the relationship among rights
and interests, law's understanding of religion quickly becomes the only
game in town. Law says "for my purposes, religion is the following";
however, in this modest claim is the seed of the larger: "and if you
appear before me, this is the only definition that will attract the
recognition of the state."
Accordingly, to appreciate the relationship between law and
religion, Canadian constitutionalism's rendering of religion takes on
tremendous importance. As I have shown, law's rendering of religion is
in the form of a triptych composed of three elements: religion is
individual, valuable because it is an expression of choice, and essentially
private. Though a manifestation of its own cultural nature, law's
understanding of religion is not of religion as culture but, rather, a
procrustean product of law's own symbolic commitments and
frameworks of understanding.
VI. CONCLUSION
We are left with something of a paradox concerning the place of
religion in modern Canadian constitutionalism. Within the legal and
political domain, religion is proclaimed to be "a culture." And so the
conventional story says that the nature of law's relationship with religion
is to be understood as an encounter with culture. Yet when we look
closely at what it means for law to say that religion is a culture, we come
away with the sense that the legal imagination carefully fabricates a
" Robert M. Cover, "The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative"
(1983) 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4.
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sense of religion as culture that comports with its own fundamental
legal-cultural assumptions about the structure of the state, what is of
value in the human, and the nature of the religious.
A fuller exploration of law's cultural rendering of religion would
go on to explore what a more robust conception of religion as culture
might look like, drawing upon sources appropriate to that project. I have
left that for another part of my work. For present purposes, suffice it to
say that a thicker understanding of religion as culture than that reflected
in the image painted by the law would open up the possibility of religion
cutting across and fundamentally challenging law's rendering of religion
explored in this piece. For example, a cultural understanding of religion
would have to account for the possibility that a hard ethical divide
between the private and public might make little sense to religion as
culture. As a symbolic system expressing not only a general order for the
world but distinct ontological claims, religion might also have the
capacity to touch upon the whole of the committed individual or even
the community. Furthermore, a robust sense of religion as culture would
have to cope with the possibility that religion provokes action as much
as it evokes emotion or internal dispositions. By contrast, in rendering
religion through the mechanism of Charter protections, contemporary
Canadian constitutionalism engages in a profound context-stripping that
attempts to make religion much more digestible within the symbolic and
normative system of constitutional cultural commitments.
The paradox of religion as culture, then, is that although law
proclaims religion to be a culture, it does not actually understand it as
such except in extremely impoverished terms. My claim, however, is
neither ,that law merely "has it wrong", nor that its conception of
religion must change. The meanings and symbolic commitments that
inform Canadian constitutional law's understanding of religion are no
more or less mutable than those that comprise a religious culture. In this
way, it is not the case that law has misunderstood religion. Law has
understood religion; it has simply done so in keeping with the culture of
Canadian constitutionalism. As such, this understanding is just one
possible rendering of religion and not one that necessarily reflects the
nature of religious conviction and its relationship with the law. In
particular, it does not afford religion the same significance, reach, and
impact that law, however tacitly, assumes for itself.
This discussion exposes the potential for a large and durable gap
between law's religion and religion viewed robustly as culture. Religion
as a culture is more complex, more interpretively ambitious, and
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therefore less manageable than law would have it. But if it is true that
law's sense of religion breaks so strongly with the cultural claims that
religion can make on communities and on individuals, then we are met
with a number of profound implications for our conventional approach
to making sense of the relationship between religious commitment and
the Canadian constitutional order. Most profoundly, there is a
fundamental, though eminently explicable, shortfall at the core of liberal
legal discourse about religious liberties. Religion is not only what law
imagines it to be. Law is blind to critical aspects of religion as culture.
That being so, even if successful at accommodating or tolerating what it
understands to be religion, aspects of religion as culture remain entirely
unattended to and, therefore, unresolved in their tension with the
constitutional rule of law. And with this insight we come to one
important part of the explanation for why the story we tell about law and
religion has proven so unsatisfactory: law-in whose capacity to tolerate,
accommodate, and "make space" for cultural claims we place so much
faith-fails to appreciate religion as culture.
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